Abstract:
The production of religious science is one of the topics that has recently been considered in academic circles around the world. In this context, despite objections to the possibility of creating religious science, some Muslim thinkers are also seeking to create Islamic humanities. While the production of Islamic humanities faces challenges. Although it has been a long time since the emergence of the logical positivist view and the decline of its dominance in science, exclusivism in the empirical method is still common in the sciences. The monopoly of the empirical method in science has led to insistence on the "principle of objectivity" and the "distinction of discovery from justification". Despite the fact that the "principle of objectivity" is based on the "monopoly of the empirical method" and the "subjectivity of values", some Muslim writers have tried to reconcile this principle with the "paradigm of the Islamic humanities." Some, while pointing to the separation of the discovery from justification, which is presented in the positivist context, have allowed the influence of values only in one of the two areas. In this article, the mentioned view has been studied by descriptive- analytic method and an attempt has been made to show the conflict of this view with the principles of "Islamic Humanities Paradigm".
Machine summary:
Examining the View of Distinguishing the Role of Collection from Judgment in the Influence of Values on Islamic Social Sciences with Respect to the Ijtihadi-Empirical View Esmail Shabandari PhD student in Comparative Philosophy, Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, Qom, Iran, (Corresponding Author).
The view that considers the separation between values and the humanities to be possible and desirable has often relied on the "principle of objectivity" of science, and opponents have contested this principle and its foundations (Gouldner, 1973: p 3; Lazi, 1362: pp.
155, 215) After rival views were able to raise certain objections to the exclusivity of the empirical method in scientific research and to some extent moderate the logical positivist view, the theory of the influence of values on knowledge also gained supporters.
As previously stated, in this view, only empirical and analytical propositions report reality and are even meaningful, while value propositions do not express reality and are meaningless; since science seeks to discover and interpret the realities of this world, the interference of non-real and non-empirical matters such as values will prevent the realism and objectivity of science; it can be said that the principle of objectivity and the view of separating collection from judgment are actually two sides of the same coin, and both, based on the foundation of "exclusivity of method in experience" and "considering values as unreal," seek to provide objectivity to the sciences by separating value and science.
In examining this view, it becomes clear that the claim of the theory of distinguishing collection from judgment in the discussion of the influence of values on Islamic human sciences is a claim without reason or benefit and is afflicted with the problems that will follow.
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