Abstract:
The great revolution of the twenty-first century in new technologies has led terrorist groups to use less expensive and easier weapons and methods to achieve their goals in line with these developments. A clear example of them, is the use of biological weapons and the application of biological threats. The importance of bioterrorism threats and their extensive works led to increased international attention to this phenomenon. In domestic law, some documents, such as the Fifth and Sixth Five-Year Programs and the Biosafety Law, have addressed this issue. The present paper aims to "study bioterrorism in international documents and domestic law" using descriptive-analytical method and data collection in a library-documentary method. The results showed in domestic law although positive steps have been taken, due to the lack of serious biological threats, the low speed of the legislature and the lack of a differentiated view, the mechanisms of combating biological terrorism not efficient and the Iranian legislature has not been convicted the Bioterrorism as an independent crime. Therefore, in order to determine the response to that behavior, it must adapted to other general criminal titles. In the international arena, the shortcomings and ambiguities in some international documents and the problem of verifying the performance of government’s, are the weaknesses of international standards in the field of biological weapons.
Machine summary:
" (Mohammadi, 1381: 261) The importance of this issue and the threat it posed to human health and security led to serious political and legal efforts at the international level in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to combat and prevent these actions, the first of which was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which explicitly prohibited the use of suffocating and poisonous gases, bacteriological warfare methods, and microbial weapons in wars and conflicts between countries.
" (Seif, 1386: 81-82) Second: No distinction has been made between military and non-military objectives, and no international organization or international authority is responsible for verifying the compliance of member states; 1 Third: The phrase "prohibition of use" is not observed in the title or the text, or in Article 6 it speaks of complaining to the Security Council, but the mechanism of this complaint is unknown; Fourth: Although Article 5 emphasizes international cooperation as an "obligation" for member states, at the same time, under the pretext of preventing proliferation and by citing Article 3 of the Convention, this obligation is explicitly violated; 2 Fifth: There is the possibility of multiple interpretations of certain definitions and ultimately violation of the Convention; for instance, assurance measures, the enactment of national implementing legislation, or the approval of biosafety regulations are none of them legally binding, rather, the member states of the Convention are only politically committed to them.
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