Abstract:
Abstract:The debate of whether existence, or being, (wujud) is a synonymous term (ishtirak ma’nawi) or homonymous term (ishtirak lafzi) appears in numerous philosophical and theological works. Some believed in its homonymous term and established other theological issues on such basis. The followers of the synonymous term for existence provided reasons as proof for their belief which appear to be distorted and invalid. The title of the reasons are، the consistency of knowledge or comprehension (‘ilm) of a thing despite having doubt towards its properties (khususiat), the first imaged thing as being (wujud), non - existence (‘adam)—the opposite of being— as a synonymous term, the accuracy (sihat) of the categorization of being, the denial of synonymous term requires its acceptance, the division of being to necessity and contingency , which necessitates difference between the two, generalization of the properties of a relational or copulative existence (wujud rabit) and independent existence (wujud mustaqil), a singular meaning in the rhyme of poetic verse. With a precise reading and analysis, it is clear that all provided reasoning contain the fallacy of ‘Begging the Question’. With that said, none of the mentioned reasons have the ability to be used towards its claim. Although it should be noted that a negation of the reason does not require the negation of its claim. As many acclaimed scholars have said, the assertion towards the synonymous term of being, in and of itself is self - evident (badihi) or close to it, and its verity is certain. In this article, we will only be discussing reasons in proof of this claim, and not in relation to its integrity or inaccuracy of the primary claim.
Machine summary:
1 1 Reza Eskandari, Mohammad Javad Rezaeira 2 Abstract The issue of the semantic unity or verbal equivocation of existence has appeared in many philosophical and theological works.
Proponents of the theory of the semantic unity of existence have presented arguments to prove their claim against those who hold to verbal equivocation, all of which appear flawed and invalid.
The titles of these arguments include: the persistence of knowledge regarding the existence of something despite doubt about its attributes; the primacy of the conception of existence; the semantic unity of non-existence as the negation of existence; the validity of the division of existence; the negation of semantic unity necessitates its acceptance; the division of existence into necessary and possible causes the distinction between the two; the generalization of the characteristic of relational existence to independent existence; and the single meaning rhyme.
217); therefore, it can be said that one of the philosophical issues that has been raised since the time of Aristotle is the semantic or verbal equivocation of the concept of existence (Motahhari, 1997, vol.
The Validity of the Division of Existence Existence can be divided into necessary and possible, and the requirement of a real division is that it must be a common subject; meaning that in a real division, the divided term (mقسم) must be present in all categories with a single meaning (Fakhr al-Razi, 1990a, Vol. 1, p.
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