Abstract:
This article examines the unsuccessful performance of the world's great industrial and military powers in small wars. By small wars, the author means wars of a limited nature that are generally carried out to counter urban and guerrilla rebellions and uprisings, as well as to expel an occupying enemy from a specific region. The author believes that victory and success in small wars are not achieved through the successful techniques and methods used in full-scale wars. In other words, small wars have an asymmetric nature that is completely different from the symmetric nature of other wars. This asymmetric nature can be observed in the strategy employed in the war, the technology used in battles, and the will of the parties involved in the conflict. This means that insurgent and indigenous groups consider small wars to be total wars and possess a very strong will to destroy their enemy, yet at the same time, they are at a much lower level of military technology than their enemy.
Machine summary:
On one hand, the great power, by its very nature, brings much superior resources and technology to such a scene of conflict, and on the other hand, the seemingly weaker enemy demonstrates a stronger will, which can be seen from the readiness ______________________________ 1- Success or effectiveness in counter-insurgency wars or low-intensity conflicts is relative.
126-51) History shows numerous examples of the failures of great powers on the battlefield of asymmetric wars: the Romans in the Teutoburg Forest, the British in the American Revolution, the French in the Korean Peninsula War and the Indochina and Algeria wars, the Americans in Vietnam and Somalia, and the Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya.
The mentioned examples are not at the same level, and it is important to clarify that the American Revolution, the Korean Peninsula War, and the Vietnam War are examples of the failure of great powers to achieve victory against strategies that were a combination of symmetric and asymmetric methods.
This article examines the scope of asymmetric warfare to provide an analysis of conflicts in which superior foreign military powers or multinational forces confront weaker countries and indigenous groups on the territory of those countries.
(London: Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research) is considered a full-scale and total war, but for great powers, it has a limited nature.
This issue causes two problems for great powers in asymmetric wars: the lack or weakness of political-military cohesion and an approach based on available information that turns into a superior pattern; namely, high or medium intensity conventional warfare.
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