Abstract:
The Fatimid Caliphate (297-567 AH), which was established as a rival government to the Abbasid Caliphate (132-656 AH) in North Africa, possessed unique political, administrative, and military characteristics. The Imams of the Ismaili Dawa period, with their network of preachers and scattered yet organized followers, established the Fatimid Caliphate in 297 AH and officially attained political and military power. In this regard, an extensive transformation occurred in the status and position of the Ismaili Imam and his surrounding circles, moving from informal to formal conditions, through which the organization of power and the redefinition of Ismaili societal elements were carried out within the framework of the customary administrative, military, and political institutions of the time. The bureaucratic and military structure was influenced by Ismaili political and social teachings and the requirements of establishing a Shiite caliphate, which did not last more than two centuries in Egypt. The most important reasons for this must be sought in their bureaucratic and military structures and the nature of the interaction between bureaucrats and military personnel and the factors affecting it. In this article, using a descriptive and analytical method, the bureaucratic and military structure and the causes of convergence and divergence in their interaction are examined, and the question of how the interaction between bureaucrats and military personnel in the first period of the Fatimid Caliphate occurred and under the influence of which factors is answered.
Machine summary:
As a result, it can be said that the interaction between the diwanis and the military officials during the era of al-Mu'izz li-Din Allah was a constructive interaction characterized by cooperation and far from competition and conflict; for it is evident that Jawhar al-Siqilli, Yaqub bin Kallas, and Qadi Nu'man bin Hayyan al-Tamimi were very diligent in promoting Ismaili beliefs and consolidating the Fatimid Caliphate, and through cooperation and compromise with one another, they achieved great successes on their path and all three were in agreement in their obedience to the Fatimid Caliph.
During the era of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, the heads of diwani and military affairs sometimes - as in the mentioned example - competed with each other, but the intense supervision and excessive violence of the Caliph toward court officials and commanders (al-Maqrizi, 1967: 2/ 14), caused that conflict and competition not to be permanent and to give way to cooperation and collaboration; because al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah's ability to suppress the rebellion of Abu al-Kuh was perceived as a sign of reviving the spirit of cooperation and collaboration in the Fatimid state.
With the transfer of the center of the caliphate to Egypt and the multiplicity of pre-designed functions previously implemented by the Tulunids and the Ikhshidids, the general and urban structure of Egypt, which followed a complex order based on the diwani activities of previous rulers, prompted Jawhar al-Siqilli—who was the representative of the Fatimids—to establish a new government structure with the help of Ja'far bin Furat and Ibn Kallas, and to reform some of Egypt's administrative legacies and change them to be consistent with the political-religious structure of the Fatimids (al-Maqrizi, 1998: 2/ 345; Ibn Tuwayr, 1992: 75).
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