Abstract:
In this article, by referring to America's successive failures in suppressing rebellions in various countries, the author addresses the causes and factors of America's inability to confront current rebellions in Iraq. Then, it refers to Britain's experiences in suppressing rebellions in colonial countries and concludes that Britain has failed in the past for similar reasons. It then addresses the close relationship between the political and military dimensions of counter-insurgency, stating that political actions must be focused on winning the hearts and minds of the people. Another point that this article pays attention to regarding the rebellion in Iraq is the role of accurate information concerning the organization, leadership, and ideology of the rebellion. According to the author, one of the reasons for America's inability in Iraq is its intelligence weakness. In conclusion, it concludes that the situation in Iraq does not possess any of the coordinates of a rebellion, but rather it is a networked war in which small and diverse cores, with different goals and ideologies, are temporarily attracted to each other and fight against America.
Machine summary:
" "Fadel al-Qubaisi, Imam of the Al-Dul al-Kabir Mosque located in the city of Ramadi, Iraq"(Filkins, March 1, 2004) In the description and framework of counterinsurgency, there is an emphasis on the political dimension — at the level of doctrine, design, execution, and most importantly, operational coordination — but the insufficient attention to this dimension during the US Army's military operations in Iraq certainly caused an insurgency that developed and — Although the sources mentioned throughout this article range from secondary scientific sources to press reports, the arguments presented therein are primarily based on discussions held between 2003 and February 2004 with US military and intelligence officers and agents, American and British officials of the Iraqi interim government, and journalists who are currently in Iraq or have recently prepared reports from Iraq.
As "John Nagl," an operations officer of the 1st Infantry Division and an expert in the field of counterinsurgency (who has taught at the West Point Military Academy and published a scholarly book on this subject [Nagl, 2002]), told a reporter last December, this sensitive civilian aspect of insurgency "is not being employed in Iraq when it could be employed" (Maas, January 11, 2004).
In fact; among the six principles of counterinsurgency, the first principle defined and stated in British doctrine is "political primacy and political objective," after which the other 5 principles are as follows: Coordinated government mechanism; Information and news; Separation of insurgents from their supporters; — Quoted in DGD&D 18/34/59 with Army ID number 71596 (parts 1 and 2), Army Combat Manual, Volume 5, Non-War Operations, "Section B: Counterinsurgency Operations, Part 2, Execution of Counterinsurgency Operations", (London: prepared under the direction and supervision of the Chief of the General Staff, 1995), pp.
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