Abstract:
One of the arguments used to defend the rationality of believing the proposition 'God exists' is Pascal's Wager. One of the most important objections to this argument is called the 'Many-Gods Objection.' In this article, we first present one of the most common formulations of Pascal's Wager, known as 'superior expected utility,' and then describe two versions of the many-gods objection. The first version is called the modal version, and the second is called the real version. For the real version, we provide three formulations that follow one another; such that the second formulation arises as an objection to the first, and the third arises as an objection to the second. As a response to the modal version, Jeff Jordan's solution will be presented. The main idea of this solution is that one cannot conclude a probability greater than zero from the logical possibility of a proposition. Then, for the second and third formulations of the real version of the many-gods objection, we provide solutions. Finally, based on Jordan's idea—that the primary goal of Pascal's Wager is simply the preference for theism over atheism, rather than the preference for a specific pattern of theism—we formulate an argument called the 'Free Wager Argument,' based on which atheism is set aside for any rational person like S. In the authors' view, the many-gods objection cannot be a serious critique of Pascal's Wager.
Machine summary:
Finally, based on Jeff Jordan's idea that the primary goal of Pascal's Wager is merely to prefer belief in God over disbelief in God, rather than preferring a specific pattern of belief in God, we formulate an argument called the "free wager argument," according to which, for any rational person like S, disbelief in God is set aside.
Existence of God, rationality of religious beliefs, Pascal's Wager, many gods objection, decision-making theory 1.
" The summary of this objection is as follows: If we look closely at the states that Pascal has considered for the wager argument (a 2×2 matrix), we will find that he only speaks of two different states for the world; the state of God's existence and the state of God's non-existence.
In fact, the matrix that Pascal has formed is the following matrix: The Christian God does not exist The Christian God exists F ∞ Belief in the existence of the Christian God F ∞- Disbelief in the existence of the Christian God Matrix Number 4 However, considering the plurality of religions in the world and the claim of infinite good, at least by some of them, various decision-making matrices can be formed.
2. 3 A response to the third form In our view, the third form of the real version of the problem of multiple gods is based on the negation of the following assumption: (8) "If the EU is equal for several equally probable actions, it does not matter which one we perform; whichever we perform, we have performed a reasonable action.
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