Abstract:
Public power in Iran has been entrusted to those institutions which are exist in constitution and laws. Moreover the other exquisite ones that are established by other norms, enjoy public power too, such as Supreme Councils of the Cultural Revolution and the cyberspace. These institutions have almost certain tasks in their establishing foundation. Generally these tasks come from the concept of policy-making. Given the creating norms by these institutions, oversighting them to ensure the norms hierarchy is inevitable. In Iran after a lot of arches, the bill of amendment of administrative justice court has recognized, under certain circumstances, the oversight on these enactments to ensure that they are within the policy-making framework. In this research, we have explored the concept, features, and levels of policy, and We have made clear the limits of the policy-making of these councils until the limitation of judicial review on the enactments of these institutions will be clear. On the one hand, we have mentioned some of the cases of these councils and realized from their evaluation that in many cases, these councils have not been committed to policy-making framework and have entered the limits of law or regulation. The latter proposition further reveals the need for judicial review on these councils.
Machine summary:
In the most recent of these rulings, the Court of Administrative Justice, through clause 4 of the precedent-setting ruling number 2896-2897 dated 1398/10/10, deemed the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution regarding the expansion of the scope of the ruling of paragraph (b) of Article 20 of the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan to be non-referable and lacking legal effect in the branches of the Court due to inconsistency with the law and exceeding jurisdiction.
In total, it can be said that the resolutions of the Supreme Councils of Cyberspace and the Cultural Revolution should remain within the scope of determining guiding (hadi) policies, and such a matter will never necessitate the approval of enforceable regulations at the level of law and regulation; the council's undertaking of such an act would constitute a violation of Articles 58 and 138 of the Constitution.
If we have an organizational indicator (the institution issuing the act) and a substantive indicator (the nature of the act that entails the executive function of the law) to identify the acts of the executive power, it must be admitted that today the second type of indicator is more common and practical; especially since the use of this indicator will activate the government in the field of designing and implementing the country's programs in the area of policymaking, using tools such as regulation, setting term-based programs, preparing legal bills, and other administrative, political, diplomatic initiatives, and the like.
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