Abstract:
Informational organizations are established in order to create recognition for politicians and also prevent the subject of raiding. So analyzing the con-nection between informational analysts and politicians is considered as a principal issue, since every kind of discord and tension in the connection can decrease decision making quality and guiding decisions and finally insecure national security basis. Firstly, the research analyzes the conditions of an ideal informational organization and then it investigates idealistic relations of between informational organization and politics making system. The next step is analyzing existence of disadvantages in the relationship between infor-mational organization and politician system that includes disadvantages such as natural conflict, politics games, extravagant consistency and negligence. Finally, the research suggests some solutions for destroying or fading above mentioned damages.
Machine summary:
B) Actionable recommendations for policymakers To strengthen the common understanding of intelligence assessments and theories and consequently enhance the level of interaction between the intelligence analyst and the policymaker as a customer, in such a way that the independence of the intelligence theorist is maintained and the policymaker also acts with confidence in the intelligence theory and accepts its risks, the following items are recommended: Politicians and decision-makers should gain full awareness of the capabilities and capacities of the intelligence community so that they do not expect clairvoyance and become certain that the intelligence theory is based on correct data that has been collected and analyzed using scientific methods and is not dependent on mental perceptions; They should consider the intelligence community as an efficient and effective source and benefit from intelligence analysts as expert specialists in discussions, reviews, and the formulation of policies; If intelligence analysis differs from the previous findings of the policymakers, they should not force the theorists to change the assessments and analyses of the intelligence community (even though they face risks in accepting it) and should not demand that they enter into advocacy for their policymaking process (Davis, 1386: 99); Intelligence theorists and analysts of intelligence products expect to observe the effects of their analytical work in decision-making.
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