Abstract:
Whenever we are discussing the nature of faith، we often have a classification based on the object of faith. Accordingly، faith is generally either propositional or non-propositional. It means that if faith belongs to one or several propositions، its nature is also propositional and a kind of knowledge. But if the object of faith is a real thing or person، the nature of faith is related to such feelings as affection، and loyalty. Through examining the prerequisites of this distinction، the following study intends to show that this classification has some formal and logical problems. Secondly، it is not strong and qualified enough to clarify the nature of faith. The second part of the article classifies faith according to the soul aspects into three groups of evidential، volitional، and emotional faith. Later، it provides some examples of Christian and Moslem philosophers and theologians' ideas regarding every kind of faith. Consequently، the paper comes to this result that determining the nature of faith based on soul aspects is a much more defensible choice than classifying based on the object of faith.
Machine summary:
Religious Anthropology Ninth Year, Number 27, Spring and Summer 2012 Pages 105-124 A New Approach in Examining the Nature of Faith with a Look at the Existential Realms of the Soul Mehdi Zakeri* Seyyed Morteza Tabatabaei** Abstract When discussing the nature of faith, a distinction is often presented based on the object of faith, according to which faith is generally either propositional or non-propositional; that is, if faith pertains to one or more propositions, its nature will also be propositional and of the kind of knowledge; but if the object of faith is a person or an external being, the nature of faith is of the kind of matters such as attachment and loyalty.
The second part of the article divides faith into intellect-based, will-based, and feeling-based faith, depending on which of the three realms of the human soul is more influential in it, and provides evidence from the theories of Christian and Muslim philosophers and theologians for each type of faith.
Some others have also considered the change of the object of faith from a proposition to an objective being as a reason to introduce the nature of faith as something of the kind of hope, trust, reliance, or interest accompanied by expectation (Malekian, n.
In the following, to maintain the order of writing, we will briefly state and examine, in a simple division, the degree of involvement of the three faculties of intellect, will, and feeling1 in faith, taking into account the views of prominent philosophers and theologians of the West and the Islamic world; so that it becomes clear in which perspectives intellect has the greatest share of faith.
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