چکیده:
It seems obvious that the mere acknowledgment of a norm cannot
explain the agent’s undertaking what the norm prescribes; Steglich-
Petersen makes the point as there is no strong relation between
normative judgments and motivation from such judgments. To explain
why someone does what a norm prescribes, according to Steglich-
Petersen, we need to know not only that they acknowledge the norm, but
that they are motivated to follow it. I will argue that this apparent truism
is false in the case of constitutive norms. In a constitutive norm, the
action specified in the correctness condition is constitutive of what is
governed by the norm. I will focus on the constitutive norm of belief to
argue that the mere acknowledgment of the norm suffices to explain the
transparency of belief. That is to say, I explain why a subject who
deliberates whether to believe that p thereby, in virtue of
acknowledgment of the belief norm, deliberates whether p
خلاصه ماشینی:
Norms and Explanation of Action Seyyed Ali KalantariIt seems obvious that the mere acknowledgment of a norm cannot explain the agent’s undertaking what the norm prescribes; Steglich- Petersen makes the point as there is no strong relation between normative judgments and motivation from such judgments.
There are cases where grasping of the norm alone suffices to explain the prescribed action without further need of the assumption that the agent is motivated to follow the norm.
g. Boghossian 2003, 2005; Shah and Velleman 2005) that the norm of belief is a constitutive one; that is to say, the correctness condition is constitutive of the action governed by the norm.
That is to say, why does mere acknowledgment that they are prescribed to undertake doxasti c deliberation by reference to its normative correctness condition make it the case that will do this?
Might it not still be the case that they fail to be motivated to follow the prescription that they acknowledge?6 The claim that the norm is constitutive is supposed to close off this possibility.
In the case of belief, the constitutive norm prescribes a correctness condition for doxastic deliberation, but that condition does not have a prescriptive content.
As such, in the belief case, the constitutive norm discharges the pr escription governing -ing by identifying the correctness condition with an action, not a further prescription to act.
Hence, where ‘deliberating whether p’ is the correctness condition for ‘deliberating whether to believe that p', mere acknowledgment of the norm governing the latter suffices to explain the agent's undertaking the former.