Abstract:
As science focuses exclusively on the physical, it seems to assume that the brain has a key role in the origin if not also the constitution of our consciousness; and thus the destruction of the brain, the nervous system, and the body makes it pointless or even absurd to think of any personal consciousness after death. But one need not be convinced by this. However, any effort to investigate a possible post-mortem life depends on forming a coherent conception of what such a life could be. Can we speak, without incoherence or contradiction, of a person continuing to exist after death in a disembodied state? Our concern in this study lies here. Based on Lund's view, we will present and defend an argument that one can conceive of a self who is fully embedded in the natural world and deeply embodied in a physical organism, and yet could have a rich variety of experiences in an afterworld encountered after death. In this theory, the close association of the mental and the physical is due to a causal connection - a connection that fails to establish that the physical brings the mental into existence and is compatible with theories that the source of consciousness is not in the brain (e. g. , the transceiver or filter theory).
Machine summary:
The Coceivability of a Disembodied Personal Life Beyond Death Based on David Lund’s Views Zainab Amiri | Abdorrasool Kashfi | Amirabbas Alizamani Received: 2020/06/23 | Accepted: 2020/09/04 Abstract As science focuses exclusively on the physical, it seems to assume that the brain has a key role in the origin if not also the constitution of our consciousness; and thus the destruction of the brain, the nervous system, and the body makes it pointless or even absurd to think of any personal consciousness after death.
Based on Lund's view, we will present and defend an argument that one can conceive of a self who is fully embedded in the natural world and deeply embodied in a physical organism, and yet could have a rich variety of experiences in an afterworld encountered after death.
366) A successful explication of a coherent and intelligible conception of personal survival is significant not only for the reasons already suggested1 but because of its bearing upon a serious objection to dualism — the contention that there is no intelligible account of it, and thus no such account of what could constitute a person’s existence after bodily death.
Lund has given reasons to believe that the continued existence of the self beyond the death of its body is possible because the conceivability of a disembodied personal life follows from a concept of a person or self2 who is the center of conscious states or experiences and is what has these states or undergoes the experiencing, unlike the body.