Abstract:
In this research, first, the cultural actions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the crisis that lasted for about a decade (1359-1368) in the Kurdish regions of Iran were reviewed. In reviewing the cultural people-oriented support of the Guard, it became clear that the institution has made some fundamental principles its focus in order to isolate crisis-creating groups and create psychological distance between them and the masses. Honoring the people, not opposing ethnic customs and traditions, and celebrating the religious and cultural personalities of that region are among those principles. After reviewing the cultural people-oriented support of the Guard, its effectiveness was measured. For this purpose, the opinions, attitudes, and positions of a number of citizens of Kurdistan province regarding those actions were assessed using a stable and valid measurement scale. The results obtained indicate the favorable attitude of the Kurdish people toward the Guards, their actions, and the types of cultural people-oriented support measures.
Machine summary:
For this reason, on one hand, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and on the other hand, to compensate for the deficiencies, injustices, and educational and cultural weaknesses resulting from the measures of the Pahlavi autocratic regime in Kurdistan, along with institutions that had taken steps alongside it to solve the Kurdistan crisis in the first decade after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, directed a significant portion of its forces, facilities, and measures toward cultural people-oriented assistance (actions) in Kurdish-populated areas to fundamentally solve the Kurdistan crisis.
Problem Statement The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as the primary responsible institution and trustee in confronting counter-revolutionary factors, insurgent groups, and elements promoting ethnic divergence during the Kurdistan crisis, never limited its scope of performance and activism to the military and paramilitary level during approximately one decade (the first decade after the victory of the Islamic Revolution); because it believed that: "Although it might be possible to eliminate opposing and insurgent factors and remove their military danger and threat through intense military actions in a not-so-long process, but without eliminating the social, political, and cultural distance between the system and the Kurdish people, changing their attitudes and positions toward the ruling political and religious system, and also revealing the real goals and purposes of the groups claiming Kurdish autonomy—the root of the Kurdistan crisis and the grounds for its emergence—will never be eliminated".
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