چکیده:
The logic of conceptualization in the social sciences is one of the epistemological and methodological controversies of the social sciences. One of the main disputes over the relationship between knowledge and value is whether it is necessary and possible for the social scientist to avoid the introduction of cultural values in the construction of concepts or are values an integral and logical element of conceptualization? In this case, how can conceptualization imbued with the values of the researcher not hinder objectivity? In answer to this question, Durkheim's positivist and naturalistic approach argues that the concepts of the social sciences are value-laden and that the involvement of researcher values in conceptualization is detrimental to objectivity. Based on Weber's post-positivist approach, which is based on the epistemology of Kant's idealism, neo-Kantians, and Nietzschean's perspectivism , the present study argues that the concepts of the social sciences are value-laden, and that value-laden of social concepts is not only an obstacle to objectivity, it is also a subjective condition of objectivity. Based on Weber's separation of Value Relation from Value Judgment, the author shows to what extent the interference of social researcher values in conceptualization is permissible and to what extent it is impermissible and detrimental to the neutrality of science and objectivity.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Based on the Weberian distinction between value-relevance and value-judgment, the author demonstrates at what level the involvement of the social researcher's values in ideal-type conceptualization is permissible, and at what level it is impermissible and disruptive to scientific impartiality and the attainment of objectivity.
(Durkheim, 1397: 50-51) In contrast to Durkheim's positivist and naturalistic approach, the present article argues in favor of this post-positivist thesis that social science concepts are value-laden yet possess objectivity, and for this investigation, it has turned to Weber's ideal-type methodology based on three reasons.
The first reason is that Weber, based on the innovative distinction between value-relevance 1 from value-judgment 2, identifies and specifies the locus of conflict where the intervention of values in conceptualization jeopardizes the objectivity of scientific research, determining at what level the involvement of the knowing agent's values in ideal-type conceptualization is permissible and at what level it is impermissible and disruptive to impartiality in science and the attainment of objectivity.
By using Weber's ideal-type methodology, it is possible to determine the locus of conflict for the legitimate yet conditional entry of values into conceptualization, so that in this way, one can address, on one hand, the concerns of those who, by referring to values, believe that science and scientific concepts cannot be value-free, and on the other hand, the concerns of those who are worried about objectivity.
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