چکیده:
The area of bargaining mechanisms has been well explored in both multi-agent systems and economics. In bargaining, participants raise/reduce their offers until an agreement is hopefully reached. In this dynamic environment, finding superior agreements without having the knowledge about the strategic private infomiation of the counterpart is considerable. In this paper, we present a simple semi-dynamic cooperative bargaining, which deals with bargaining of single-buyer and single-seller in a multi-criteria single-good e-Marketplace. Both buyer and seller are equipped with medial agents that cooperatively want to win bargaining via a slight maneuver, over their own preferences that are unknown to each other. We show the results obtained using the simulation. This approach shows that the lack of intersection between threshold utility intervals of both parties does not necessarily yield a disagreement. On the other hand, if the party whose utility threshold is lower than the utility threshold of the other party makes the initial offer, the two parties will certainly have anagreement in a single round.
خلاصه ماشینی:
, [min validpp max validpz] have been defined for criteria l through "c- Both buyer and seller agents have private utility functions based on different weightings on each criterion.
During bargaining phases, both buyer and seller agents make offer and counter-offers based on their preferred utilities with the hope to reach a profitable agreement.
An offer OB on good G from seller S to buyer B falls into the white utility region, if & uB ( OB1•- where and are the lower utility value threshod of the buyer B s gold and white Iranian Jpurnal of InfoFma$ion Science & Technology, Volume d Number 2 guTv/December, 2006 region respectively.
-THE KNOWLEDGE BASE PRE-CALCULATION For the good wiih up criteria, we suppose the following nc-dimensional matrix in the size of nv¿ x x nvpp for each agent A, which represents the utility values of all possible preferences of A, where nvC is the number of values of the Cth criterion of good from the JulyfDecember, 2006 Iranian JournN of Information Science & Technology, Volume 4, Number 2 A's point of view (see Hypotheses in Formal Terms).
In the same way, a seller will dispatch his agent with medial behavior equipped with a preference matrix and corresponding risk factor to bargain in order to sell good according to his own utility constraints.
July/December, 2006 Ironies Jeuwal of Information Science (View the image of this page) & Technology, Volume 4, Number 2 In the same way, an arbitrary medial rational seller computes an alternative yielding the best utility 0.